Authors
Kyle G. Fritz
University of Mississippi
Daniel J. Miller
West Virginia University
Abstract
It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer.
Keywords hypocrisy  blame  moral standing  hypocritical blame  equality of persons
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.019
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References found in this work BETA

Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.

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Citations of this work BETA

Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: A Reply to Fritz and Miller.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):101-105.
Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.

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