Van Fraassen's dissolution of Putnam's model-theoretic argument

Philosophy of Science 66 (1):158-164 (1999)

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen has recently argued for a "dissolution" of Hilary Putnam's well-known model-theoretic argument. In this paper I argue that, as it stands, van Fraassen's reply to Putnam is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it suggests the form a successful response might take

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Mathias Frisch
Universität Hannover

References found in this work

Putnam’s Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.

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Citations of this work

On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge.William Demopoulos - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):371-403.
Users, Structures, and Representation.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):285-306.
Scientific Realism, the Galilean Strategy, and Representation.Mauricio Suárez - 2009 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):269-292.
A Realistic Look at Putnam's Argument Against Realism.Vadim Batitsky - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (3):299-321.

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