Why Suspend Judging?

Noûs 51 (2):302-326 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that suspension of judgment is intimately tied to inquiry and in particular that one is suspending judgment about some question if and only if one is inquiring into that question.

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Jane Friedman
New York University

Citations of this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.
Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.
The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.

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References found in this work

Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Gambling with truth.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Cambridge,: MIT Press.
The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.

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