Wissenschaftslogik : The role of logic in the philosophy of science

Synthese 164 (3):385 - 400 (2008)
Carl Hempel introduced what he called "Craig's theorem" into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the "problem of theoretical terms." Beginning with Hempel's use of 'Craig's theorem," I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel's treatment of the "problem of theoretical terms" and Carnap's in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap's mature philosophy. Carnap's treatment, in particular, is fundamentally antimetaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine
Keywords Logic  Philosophy of science  Theoretical terms  Ramsey-sentences
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9356-0
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References found in this work BETA
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.

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Carnap's Ramseyfications Defended.Thomas Uebel - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):71-87.

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