Hume and the enactive approach to mind

Abstract
An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms of philosophical scholarship. This paper aims to show that, even though Hume’s recognition in the cognitive sciences has so far been limited, there is an opportunity to reevaluate his work in the context of more recent scientific developments. In particular, it is argued that we can gain a better understanding of his overall philosophy by tracing the ongoing establishment of the enactive approach. In return, this novel interpretation of Hume’s ‘science of man’ is used as the basis for a consideration of the current and future status of the cognitive sciences.
Keywords Enactivism  Hume  Phenomenology  Life  Mind  Enactive  Cognitive science  Human nature
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9111-5
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How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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Sociality and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis.Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.

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