In P. D. Magnus Jacob Busch (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)

Authors
Greg Frost-Arnold
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
P. D. Magnus
State University of New York, Albany
Abstract
The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin suggests that the response is never appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical rivals response; since Einstein’s arguments are generally accepted, the response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate? We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton’s view and that of Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them
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References found in this work BETA

The Empirical Stance.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.
The Empirical Stance.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2002 - Yale University Press.
Space, Time, and Spacetime.Lawrence Sklar - 1974 - University of California Press.
On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation.W. V. Quine - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):178-183.
The Empirical Stance.Elijah Millgram - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):404-408.

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretative Equivalence.Kevin Coffey - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):821-844.

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