The Large Scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):826-838 (2004)

Authors
Greg Frost-Arnold
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Abstract
Two central and well-known philosophical goals of the logical empiricists are the unification of science and the elimination of metaphysics. I argue, via textual analysis, that these two apparently distinct planks of the logical empiricist party platform are actually intimately related. From the 1920’s through 1950, one abiding criterion for judging whether an apparently declarative assertion or descriptive term is metaphysical is that that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. I explore various versions of this criterion throughout the works of Carnap and Neurath.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1086/508113
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,395
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
64 ( #139,225 of 2,291,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #827,672 of 2,291,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature