Philosophy of Science 77 (1):35-58 (2010)

Authors
Greg Frost-Arnold
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Abstract
I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.
Keywords scientific realism  no-miracles argument  inference to the best explanation
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DOI 10.1086/650207
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