A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts
In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135 (2014)
Abstract
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it reinforces dualism.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
"Reflection on: Mary in the black-and-white room".Martina Fürst - 2021 - In Helen De Cruz (ed.), Philosophy Illustrated. 40 thought experiments to broaden your mind. Oxford University Press.
Illusionism: an Argument for Its Incoherence.Alen Lipuš & Janez Bregant - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):341-352.
Smells, exemplars and evidence: smelling knowledge of the external world.Keith Lehrer - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):611-631.
Conceptos Fenoménicos.Diana Couto - 2020 - Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.
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What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.