In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135 (2014)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of phenomenal concepts that has strong explanatory power does not explain away dualist intuitions—rather, it reinforces dualism.
|
| Keywords | Phenomenal Concepts Phenomenal Character Dualism Self-representation |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
View all 44 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Conceptos Fenoménicos.Diana Couto - 2020 - Enciclopedia de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica.
Smells, Exemplars and Evidence: Smelling Knowledge of the External World.Keith Lehrer - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):611-631.
Similar books and articles
Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness.James Tartaglia - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):817-838.
Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter , Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial.Robert Schroer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Using Phenomenal Concepts to Explain Away the Intuition of Contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.
Phenomenal Concepts as Bare Recognitional Concepts: Harder to Debunk Than You Thought, …but Still Possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
Cognitive Architecture and the Epistemic Gap: Defending Physicalism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Peter Fazekas - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):21-29.
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2014-01-16
Total views
121 ( #85,524 of 2,438,914 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #31,849 of 2,438,914 )
2014-01-16
Total views
121 ( #85,524 of 2,438,914 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #31,849 of 2,438,914 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
