Artifactual Normativity

Synthese 200 (126):1-19 (2022)
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Abstract

A central tension shaping metaethical inquiry is that normativity appears to be subjective yet real, where it’s difficult to reconcile these aspects. On the one hand, normativity pertains to our actions and attitudes. On the other, normativity appears to be real in a way that precludes it from being a mere figment of those actions and attitudes. In this paper, I argue that normativity is indeed both subjective and real. I do so by way of treating it as a special sort of artifact, where artifacts are mind-dependent yet nevertheless can carve at the joints of reality. In particular, I argue that the properties of being a reason and being valuable for are grounded in attitudes yet are still absolutely structural.

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Author's Profile

Christopher Frugé
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Artifact.Risto Hilpinen - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Artifact.Beth Preston - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value After Death.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Ratio 35 (3):194-203.
Joints and Basic Ways.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.

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