Aggregating Personal Value

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 19 (2024)
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Abstract

A person possesses value from various components of wellbeing, but they also have overall wellbeing from various instances of value taken together. Most ethicists assume that there is an objectively unique way that wellbeing from components aggregates into overall wellbeing. However, I argue that aggregation is subjective and varies depending on what sort of aggregation a person values. I end with some implications for the significance of death.

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Christopher Frugé
University of Oxford

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