Ratio 35 (3):194-203 (2022)
AbstractDoes our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. I provide two arguments for this claim on the basis of postmortem harms and benefits as well as the lasting significance of death. I suggest two ways of underwriting posthumous wellbeing.
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References found in this work
Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Clarendon Press.
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