Abstract

This thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between realism in philosophy and in social science. I attempt to expound and defend two principal arguments; first, that a realist approach in philosophy is a precondition of understanding science as a rational activity; secondly, that only a realist approach to the understanding of social phenomena seems to offer hope for developing an account of social inquiry based on scientific principles. However, these two arguments are developed by way of a critical analysis of the realist view in relationship to some of its major rivals. Consequently, as well as my realist exposition of Marx's methodology of science outlined in chapters five and six, where I argue that only a dialectico-causal interpretation of historical materialism seems to meet the requirements of an historical science, there is a chapter on Weber's methodology and a section on other approaches to social science stating my case against the attempt to found social inquiry on alternative cognitive foundations. In addition, the argument against non-realist views of social science is extended to the critique of Marxism itself especially in the context of the theories of Colletti and Althusser contained in chapter 4