Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: Modulating relevance in uncertain conditionals
Journal of Pragmatics 43:2034–2042 (2011)
According to probabilistic theories of reasoning in psychology, people's degree of belief in an indicative conditional `if A, then B' is given by the conditional probability, P(B|A). The role of language pragmatics is relatively unexplored in the new probabilistic paradigm. We investigated how consequent relevance aects participants' degrees of belief in conditionals about a randomly chosen card. The set of events referred to by the consequent was either a strict superset or a strict subset of the set of events referred to by the antecedent. We manipulated whether the superset was expressed using a disjunction or a hypernym. We also manipulated the source of the dependency, whether in long-term memory or in the stimulus. For subset-consequent conditionals, patterns of responses were mostly conditional probability followed by conjunction. For superset-consequent conditionals, conditional probability responses were most common for hypernym dependencies and least common for disjunction dependencies, which were replaced with responses indicating inferred consequent irrelevance. Conditional probability responses were also more common for knowledge-based than stimulus-based dependencies. We suggest
|Keywords||Probability Conditionals Interpretation Relevance|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
The Probability of Iterated Conditionals.Janneke Wijnbergen‐Huitink, Shira Elqayam & David E. Over - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (4):788-803.
Similar books and articles
Pronounced Inferences: A Study on Inferential Conditionals.Sara Verbrugge, Kristien Dieussaert, Walter Schaeken, Hans Smessaert & William Van Belle - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 13 (2):105 – 133.
How People Interpret an Uncertain If.Andrew Jb Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, Bastian Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. pp. 80-91.
Experiments on Aristotle's Thesis: Towards an Experimental Philosophy of Conditionals.Niki Pfeifer - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):223-240.
Uncertain Deductive Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter - 2011 - In K. Manktelow, D. E. Over & S. Elqayam (eds.), The Science of Reason: A Festschrift for Jonathan St B.T. Evans. Psychology Press. pp. 145--166.
The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
How People Interpret Conditionals: Shifts Towards the Conditional Event.A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2011 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 37 (3):635-648.
Capturing the Relationship Between Conditionals and Conditional Probability with a Trivalent Semantics.Daniel Rothschild - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):144-152.
Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and the “Defective Truth-Table”: A Request for More Experiments.Peter Milne - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224.
On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.James Hawthorne - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
Added to index2011-04-22
Total downloads40 ( #126,248 of 2,153,823 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #225,089 of 2,153,823 )
How can I increase my downloads?