Deontic Modals: Why Abandon the Default Approach

Erkenntnis 82 (6):1351-1365 (2017)

Authors
André Fuhrmann
Goethe University Frankfurt
Abstract
John Horty has proposed an approach to reasoning with ought-propositions which stands in contrast to the standard modal approach to deontic logic. Horty’s approach is based on default theories as known from the framework of Default Logic. It is argued that the approach cannot be extended beyond the most simple kinds of default theories and that it fails in particular to account for conditional obligations. The most plausible ways of straightening out the defects of the approach conform to a simple theory of default reasoning in standard deontic language.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9879-1
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