Episteme 1 (1):23-34 (2004)
When Peter Strawson subtitled the most celebrated book in ordinary language philosophy, Individuals, ‘An essay in descriptive metaphysics’, he shocked mainly for having reintroduced ‘metaphysics’ into intellectually respectable English a quarter-century after A.J. Ayer had consigned it to the logical positivists' index of forbidden philosophical words . Few at the time appreciated the import of the modifiers ‘descriptive’ and its opposite, ‘revisionary’. Now, another half century on, philosophers have come around to Bertrand Russell's original view that both the ordinary language philosophy Strawson championed and the ideal scientific language philosophy Ayer championed offer alternative metaphysical visions. The remaining question of philosophical interest is what hangs in the balance between a descriptive and revisionary approach to metaphysics – or, for that matter, any branch of philosophy. This paper critically examines the currently dominant descriptive approach from a revisionary standpoint, initially relying on the terms Strawson uses to frame the distinction, and then moving outward to consider its implications for our understanding of the history of modern philosophy, especially the ‘naturalist’ sensibility that has been especially influential in analytic social epistemology
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society.Bruno Latour - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluation in Goldman's Descriptive Epistemology.James R. Beebe - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):163-186.
Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller's Social Epistemology.Francis Remedios - 2003 - Lexington Books.
Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics.Susan Haack - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):361 - 371.
Descriptive and Revisionary Theories of Events.Leemon B. McHenry - 1996 - Process Studies 25:90-103.
The Normative Failure of Fuller's Social Epistemology.Heidi E. Grasswick - 2001 - Social Epistemology 16 (2):133 – 148.
Descriptive Versus Revisionary Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem.R. L. Phillips - 1967 - Philosophy 42 (160):105 - 118.
On Regulating What is Known: A Way to Social Epistemology.Steve Fuller - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):145 - 183.
Social Epistemology or Cognitive Sociology? On Steve Fuller's Interpretation of Thomas Kuhn.Piet Strydom - 2003 - Social Epistemology 17 (2-3):297-300.
Real Metaphysics and the Descriptive/Revisionary Distinction.Cynthia Macdonald - 2007 - In Cornelis De Waal (ed.), Susan Haack: A Lady of Distinctions: The Philosopher Responds to Critics. Prometheus Books.
Added to index2010-07-11
Total downloads27 ( #185,467 of 2,153,858 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #225,089 of 2,153,858 )
How can I increase my downloads?