Authors
Barbara Fultner
Denison University
Abstract
A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only by our grasping its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1177/0191453705048315
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
124 ( #87,275 of 2,454,825 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,241 of 2,454,825 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes