Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture

Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237 (2014)

Authors
Richard Samuels
Ohio State University
Tim Fuller
Ohio State University (PhD)
Abstract
Do accounts of scientific theory formation and revision have implications for theories of everyday cognition? We maintain that failing to distinguish between importantly different types of theories of scientific inference has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the relationship between science and everyday cognition. In this article, we focus on one influential manifestation of this phenomenon which is found in Fodor's well-known critique of theories of cognitive architecture. We argue that in developing his critique, Fodor confounds a variety of distinct claims about the holistic nature of scientific inference. Having done so, we outline more promising relations that hold between theories of scientific inference and ordinary cognition
Keywords Cognitive architecture  Scientific inference
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DOI 10.1111/mila.12047
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Fodor on Global Cognition and Scientific Inference.Sheldon Chow - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):157-178.

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