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Inferential Internalism and the presuppositions of skeptical arguments
In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 157--167 (2004)
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Citations of this work
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
Evidential support, reliability, and Hume's problem of induction.Chris Tucker - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):503-519.
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