Relational, non-relational, and mixed theories of experience

In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. pp. 21-28 (2000)
In this paper I argue that there are excellent reasons to embrace nonrelational (adverbial) analyses of sensations and intentional states. I shall further argue, however, that the epistemology of experience requires that we recognize at least one conscious state that is genuinely relational—awareness or acquaintance. It is through the relational state of being acquainted with non-relational mental states that one can end a regress of justification
Keywords Experience  Knowledge  Perception  Relational
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