Frankfurt cases and overdetermination

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369 (2009)
In traditional Frankfurt cases some conditions that make an outcome unavoidable fail to bring about that outcome. These are cases of causal preemption. I defend this interpretation of traditional Frankfurt cases, and its application to free will, against a dilemma raised by various libertarians. But I go on to argue that Frankfurt cases involving gen- uine causal overdetermination are even more effective at achieving the compatibilist’s purposes. Such cases avoid the “flicker of freedom” debate and better display the central disagreement with regard to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0053
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