Reply to Doody

Philosophical Psychology 30 (5):677-681 (2017)
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Abstract

In an earlier paper, we appealed to various empirical studies to make the case that the unconscious mind is capable of robust self-deception. Paul Doody has challenged our interpretations of that empirical evidence. In this reply we defend our interpretations, arguing that the unconscious is engaged in strategic and flexible goal pursuit.

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Author Profiles

David Barrett
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Eric Funkhouser
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Citations of this work

Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge.Graham Hubbs - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):25-47.

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