Leibnizian causation

Abstract
This article examines Leibniz's philosophy of causation with the aim of clarifying how causes are related to their effects. I argue that, much like J. L. Mackie's INUS conditions, Leibnizian causes are members of complex causal conditions. More precisely, Leibniz identifies causes with elements of complex causal conditions, where the complex condition as a whole is sufficient for the effect, and the cause is a necessary part of that condition. This conception of causation is able to incorporate Leibniz's many other definitions of ‘cause’, thereby resolving what appear to be internal inconsistencies in his philosophy of science. Introduction The ingredients of causation Causes and conditions Causes as INUS conditions Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi126
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