Supervenience and (non-modal) reductionism in Leibniz's philosophy of time

Abstract
It has recently been suggested that, for Leibniz, temporal facts globally supervene on causal facts, with the result that worlds differing with respect to their causal facts can be indiscernible with respect to their temporal facts. Such an interpretation is at variance with more traditional readings of Leibniz’s causal theory of time, which hold that Leibniz reduces temporal facts to causal facts. In this article, I argue against the global supervenience construal of Leibniz’s philosophy of time. On the view of Leibniz defended here, he adopts a non-modal reduction of time to events, a form of reductionism that entails a strong covariation between a world’s temporal facts and its causal facts. Consequently, worlds discernible with respect to their temporal facts must be discernible with respect to their causal facts, and worlds discernible with respect to their causal facts must be discernible with respect to their temporal facts. This position strongly favors the standard identificatory reduction of time to causation often imputed to Leibniz.Author Keywords: Leibniz; Time; Causation; Supervenience; Reduction
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1016/S0039-3681(02)00031-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,824
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Supervenience and (Non-Modal) Reductionism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Time.J. M. - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):793-810.
Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism.Erhan Demircioglu - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
Modality and Supervenience.Danilo Suster - 1996 - Acta Analytica 15 (15):141-155.
Supervenience for Operators.John Divers - 1996 - Synthese 106 (1):103-12.
Supervenience and Reductionism.Franz von Kutschera - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):333-343.
Varieties of Supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
Leibniz's Non-Tensed Theory of Time.Michael J. Futch - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):125 – 139.
Time Unbounded.Michael J. Futch - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):321-334.
Psychophysical Supervenience, Dependency, and Reduction.Cynthia Macdonald - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 140--57.
Varieties of Supervenience.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1994 - In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16--59.
Weak Supervenience and Materialism.William E. Seager - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.
Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Physicalism and Global Supervenience.Paul K. Moser - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):71-82.
Reductionism and the Mental.Martin Bunzl - 1987 - American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (April):181-9.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-09-02

Total downloads

14 ( #336,901 of 2,178,170 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #166,021 of 2,178,170 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums