History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):69-84 (1994)
AbstractIn the first half of the 17th century the Aristotelian view that the same statement or belief may be true at one time and false at another and, on the other hand, the conception of a mental proposition as a fully explicit thought that lends a definite meaning to a declarative sentence originated a lively debate concerning the question whether a mental proposition can change its truth-value.In this article it is shown that the defenders of a negative answer and the advocates of a positive answer argued on the basis of different notions of what a mental proposition is:one side taking it as more or less equivalent to a specific utterance?meaning and the other side as more or less equivalent to a generic sentence-meaning
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Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity.Gabriël Nuchelmans - 1973 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..