Freedom in Necessity: The Moral Psychology of Spinoza's Rationalism
Dissertation, University of Kentucky (
1993)
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Abstract
Traditionally, attempts at resolving the problem of accounting for the possibility of human freedom against the background of determinism have assumed that the options available are to: endorse determinism and deny human freedom, deny determinism in order to make room for human freedom, or find a compatibilist reconciliation. Commonly, the problem is addressed from an 'externalist' perspective. In the dissertation, the issue is refocused upon the positions of 'internalists' such as Frankfurt, Watson, Taylor, and Wolf. Their compatibilist approaches emphasize the importance of first person, psychological characteristics of agents as the salient determinants of human freedom. But each of these internalist approaches are found to be wanting. Consequently, the dissertation considers an alternative internalist view, that of Spinoza. I examine in detail Spinoza's concept of freedom, as it emerges from his overall metaphysical system, and note that his compatibilism not only affirms determinism, but further holds that a certain kind of necessity is a prerequisite to any coherent account of freedom. I then proceed to show that, by comparison with the views of the aforementioned contemporary compatibilists, only Spinoza's concept of freedom can account for a 'developmental' view of human nature, one which depicts the self as engaged in a process of liberation from the sort of psychological determinism which feeds upon ignorance