Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114 (2006)
Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.
|Keywords||Dualism Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Interactionism Physicalism Properties Qualia|
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On Robinson's Response to the Self-Stultifying Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):627-641.
A Limited Defense of Epiphenomenalism.S. Tammelleo - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):40-51.
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