Evidence and What We Make of It

Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):89-99 (2014)

Authors
Logan Paul Gage
Franciscan University of Steubenville
Abstract
Some prominent epistemologists make a distinction between evidence on the one hand and what is made of that evidence by a subject on the other. For reasons that will become clear, this view threatens the evidentialist project. Yet, I argue, it is possible to retain evidentialism while preserving the intuition behind this distinction. First, I explain this distinction and illustrate it with two examples. Second, I explain what is at stake for evidentialism. Third, I develop a possible solution to the problem. I close by considering some likely objections to this solution.
Keywords evidence  evidentialism  peer disagreement  mentalism
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Reprint years 2014
ISBN(s) 0897-2346
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201430247
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Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases.Logan Paul Gage - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):57-70.

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