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Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates and Hempel's Ravens
Erkenntnis 14 (2):105 - 147 (1979)
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Citations of this work
Probabilities over rich languages, testing and randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.
State of the field: Measuring information and confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):364-372.
How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275.
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