Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):239--261 (1989)

Known as an upholder of subjectivism, Bruno de finetti (1906-1985) put forward a totally original philosophy of probability. This can be qualified as a combination of empiricism and pragmatism within an entirely coherent antirealistic perspective. The paper aims at clarifying the central features of such a philosophical position, Which is not only incompatible with any perspective based on an objective notion, But cannot be assimilated to other subjective views of probability either
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DOI 10.1007/BF01236565
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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Operationism, Probability and Quantum Mechanics.Maria Carla Galavotti - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):99-118.
Pragmatism and the Birth of Subjective Probability.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2019 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 11 (1).
Harold Jeffreys' Probabilistic Epistemology: Between Logicism and Subjectivism.Maria Carla Galavotti - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):43-57.

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