Conceptual multiplicity and structure

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):764-765 (1999)
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Abstract

Dienes & Perner make three mistakes in their account of the “natural language meaning” of implicit-explicit knowledge: They fail to take the multiplicity of use of a concept seriously enough, they arbitrarily separate use of a concept and its conceptual structure, and they tend to tailor their analysis for use by the Representational Theory of Knowledge.

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