Comments on the will to believe

Social Epistemology 20 (1):35 – 39 (2006)
Kasher and Nishi interpret James as holding an expressivist theory about epistemic duties, as well as other normative sentences. On this interpretation, James's claim that we have a will-to-believe type option to believe an epistemic duty winds up being inconsistent. For one can believe only that which is either true or false; but, for the expressivist, normative claims are neither. It is argued that Feldman's essay is not only a wildly anachronistic account of Clifford and James but also is of no philosophical merit in its own right.
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DOI 10.1080/02691720500512309
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