Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569 (2010)

Authors
Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis
Abstract
I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1075/pc.18.3.04gal
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,577
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.
Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge.Ulric Neisser - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):35 – 59.
A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Towards a Phenomenology of the Unconscious: Husserl and Fink on Versunkenheit.Saulius Geniusas - forthcoming - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology:1-23.
Cotard Syndrome, Self-Awareness, and I-Concepts.Rocco Joseph Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180.
Subcortical Regions and the Self.Georg Northoff - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100-101.
Self-Intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
Time, Thought, and Consciousness.J. Glicksohn & S. Lipperman-Kreda - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3-4):289-305.
Somaesthetics and the Care of the Body.Shaun Gallagher - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):305-313.
Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-12-01

Total views
46 ( #230,908 of 2,446,658 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #456,908 of 2,446,658 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes