Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326 (2005)

Authors
Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis
Abstract
Those who argue that free will is an illusion are wrong. They base their argument on scientific evidence that tests the wrong level of description for intentional action. Free will is not about subpersonal neuronal processes, muscular activation, or basic bodily movements, but about contextualized actions in a system that is larger than many contemporary philosophers of mind, psychologists, and neuroscientists consider. In this paper, I describe the kind of intentionality that goes with the exercise of free will.
Keywords Action  Free Will  Intentionality  Metaphysics
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