Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):163-178 (2008)

Authors
Shaun Gallagher
University of Memphis
Abstract
The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
Keywords Embodied cognition   Extended mind  Enactive perception  Intersubjectivity  Object perception
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DOI 10.1007/s11007-008-9075-8
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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Citations of this work BETA

Merleau-Ponty on Shared Emotions and the Joint Ownership Thesis.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
Sociality and the Life–Mind Continuity Thesis.Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

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