No one can serve two epistemic masters

Philosophical Studies:1-10 (forthcoming)
Authors
J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Consider two epistemic experts—for concreteness, let them be two weather forecasters. Suppose that you aren’t certain that they will issue identical forecasts, and you would like to proportion your degrees of belief to theirs in the following way: first, conditional on either’s forecast of rain being x, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be x. Secondly, conditional on them issuing different forecasts of rain, you’d like your own degree of belief in rain to be some weighted average of the forecast of each. Finally, you’d like your degrees of belief to be given by an orthodox probability measure. Moderate ambitions, all. But you can’t always get what you want.
Keywords Expert deference  Formal Epistemology  Disagreement  Linear Averaging
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0964-8
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