On Hans Reichenbach’s inductivism

Synthese 181 (1):95 - 111 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the first to criticize the verifiability theory of meaning embraced by logical empiricists, Reichenbach ties the significance of scientific statements to their predictive character, which offers the condition for their testability. While identifying prediction as the task of scientific knowledge, Reichenbach assigns induction a pivotal role, and regards the theory of knowledge as a theory of prediction based on induction. Reichenbach's inductivism is grounded on the frequency notion of probability, of which he prompts a more flexible version than that of Richard von Mises. Unlike von Mises, Reichenbach attempts to account for single case probabilities, and entertains a restricted notion of randomness, more suitable for practical purposes. Moreover, Reichenbach developed a theory of induction, absent from von Mises's perspective, and argued for the justification of induction. This article outlines the main traits of Reichenbach's inductivism, with special reference to his book Experience and prediction

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-07-04

Downloads
87 (#177,873)

6 months
2 (#658,848)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Causality and explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.
Testability and meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Testability and Meaning.Rudolf Carnap - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):137-137.

View all 32 references / Add more references