Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects or reflectively introspects one's experiences, or in the instant of self-recognition of one's image in the mirror, or in the proper use of the first-person pronoun, or in the construction of a self-narrative. Rather, these different kinds of self-consciousness are to be distinguished from the pre-reflective self-consciousness which is present whenever I am living through or undergoing an experience, i.e., whenever I am consciously perceiving the world, whenever I am thinking an occurrent thought, whenever I am feeling sad or happy, thirsty or in pain, and so forth
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Plural Self-Awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
Self-Consciousness in Non-Communicative Patients.S. LaureyS, F. Perrin & S. Bredart - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):722-741.
Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking Their Body? [REVIEW]Yochai Ataria & Yuval Neria - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (2):159-178.
The Neural Basis of Event-Time Introspection.Adrian G. Guggisberg, Sarang S. Dalal, Armin Schnider & Srikantan S. Nagarajan - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1899-1915.
Who Am I in Out of Body Experiences? Implications From OBEs for the Explanandum of a Theory of Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):183-197.
Similar books and articles
Consciousness and Awareness - Switched-on Rheostats: A Response to de Quincey.Robert Arp - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.
Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology.Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87.
Thinking About Consciousness: Phenomenological Perspectives.Dan Zahavi - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
Subcortical Regions and the Self.Georg Northoff - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100-101.
No Heterophenomenology Without Autophenomenology: Variations on a Theme of Mine. [REVIEW]Eduard Marbach - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):75-87.
Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads197 ( #21,729 of 2,177,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #26,230 of 2,177,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?