Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108 (2001)
Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person's mental states and behaviors. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about secondperson interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another's behavior. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely, that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding other persons, go beyond both the phenomenological and the scientific evidence. I argue that the interpretation of "primary intersubjectivity" as merely precursory to theory of mind is inadequate. Rather, primary intersubjectivity, understood as a set of embodied practices and capabilities, is not only primary in a developmental sense, but is the primary way we continue to understand others in second-person interactions
|Keywords||Cognition Metaphysics Mind Psychology Science Simulation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context.S. Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543.
Participatory Sense-Making.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.
The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: A Critique. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):519-540.
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