Updating for Externalists

Noûs (forthcoming)

Authors
J. Dmitri Gallow
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
The externalist says that your evidence could fail to tell you what evidence you do or not do have. In that case, it could be rational for you to be uncertain about what your evidence is. This is a kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesian epistemology has difficulty modeling. For, if externalism is correct, then the orthodox Bayesian learning norms of conditionalization and reflection are inconsistent with each other. I recommend that an externalist Bayesian reject conditionalization. In its stead, I provide a new theory of rational learning for the externalist. I defend this theory by arguing that its advice will be followed by anyone whose learning dispositions maximize expected accuracy. I then explore some of this theory’s consequences for the rationality of epistemic akrasia, peer disagreement, undercutting defeat, and uncertain evidence.
Keywords updating  externalism  conditionalization  anti-luminosity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/nous.12307
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

View all 73 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Dilemma for the Imprecise Bayesian.Namjoong Kim - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1681-1702.
Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.
Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence.James Hawthorne - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
Sleeping Beauty and De Nunc Updating.Namjoong Kim - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.
Conditionalization and Rational Belief Change.Susan Nicolet Vineberg - 1992 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-07-12

Total views
183 ( #45,638 of 2,311,321 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #12,910 of 2,311,321 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature