Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (4):863 - 898 (1997)
AbstractJames's most original and important contribution was his moralizing of epistemology, in particular belief-acceptance and truth. We are always to believe in a way that maximizes desire-satisfaction, with a proposition counting as true when a belief in it maximizes desire-satisfaction. The theory of truth that falls out of James's pragmatic theory of meaning must be downgraded to a theory of when a proposition is epistemology warranted, thus the reason for the scare-quotation marks around "Truth" in the title of the paper
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