Analysis 79 (1):34-43 (2019)

Authors
Will Gamester
University of Leeds
Abstract
Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of truth. Monistic theories are not guaranteed to satisfy these constraints, and there is a pluralistic theory that does so.
Keywords Truth pluralism  Mixed Inferences  Mixed Compounds  Logic  Necessary truth preservation  Logical form  Truth monism  Correspondence theory of truth
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anx165
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

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Citations of this work BETA

Alethic Pluralism and Logical Form.Chase Wrenn - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):249-265.

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