Belief’s minimal rationality

Philosophical Studies:1-20 (forthcoming)

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Abstract
Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes.
Keywords Belief  Irrationality  Assertion  Cognitive dissonance
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01369-y
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References found in this work BETA

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Why Be Rational?Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.

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