Doubting Assertion

Philosophia 44 (3):1-13 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One main argument that has been offered in support of the Knowledge Account of Assertion is that it successfully makes sense of a variety of Moorean-paradoxical claims. David Sosa has objected to the Knowledge Account by arguing that it does not generalize satisfactorily to make sense of the oddity of iterated conjunctions of the form “p but I don’t know whether I know that p”. Recently, Martin Montminy has offered a defense of the Knowledge Account. In this paper, I show that both Montminy’s and Sosa’s arguments fail. First, I argue that Montminy does not offer a good reply to Sosa; then I show that Sosa’s objection actually does not constitute a real threat to the Knowledge Account.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,764

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.
Explaining dubious assertions.Martin Montminy - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.
Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions.Matthew Benton - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358.
The status of the knowledge account of assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):782-798.
Unsafe Assertions.Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
Knowledge and suberogatory assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases.John Turri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):759-775.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-07

Downloads
69 (#212,343)

6 months
1 (#1,018,209)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.

View all 29 references / Add more references