Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):333-353 (2008)

Mihai Ganea
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism can be criticized for the implicit reliance on the existence of what might be called absolutely undecidable statements. Neil Tennant attacks epistemic optimism, the view that there are no such statements. I expose what seem serious flaws in his attack, and I suggest a way of defending the use of classical logic in arithmetic that circumvents the issue of optimism. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. CiteULike    Connotea    What's this?
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Reprint years 2007, 2008
DOI 10.1093/philmat/nkm043
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Reflecting on Incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Conceptions of Truth in Intuitionism.Panu Raatikainen - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45.

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