Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534 (2010)
In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at stake in deciding between these two ways of understanding our everyday view. In the third and final part of the paper we offer an argument in favour of our alternative
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study.Murat Aydede (ed.) - 2005 - MIT Press.
Reid's Rejection of Intentionalism.Todd Ganson - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 4:245-263.
Citations of this work BETA
Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain. [REVIEW]Alex Byrne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):489-496.
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