Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 36 (1):49-62 (2021)
AbstractFictionalism about a kind of disputed object is often motivated by the fact that the view interprets discourse about those objects literally without an ontological commitment to them. This paper argues that this motivation is inadequate because some viable alternatives to fictionalism have similar attractions. Meinongianism—the view that there are true statements about non-existent objects—is one such view. Meinongianism bears significant similarity to fictionalism, so intuitive doubts about its viability are difficult to sustain for fictionalists. Moreover, Meinongianism avoids some of fictionalism’s weaknesses, thus it is even preferable to fictionalism in some respects.
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