Understanding the Immediacy of Other Minds

European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1305-1326 (2017)
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Abstract
In this paper we address the epistemological debate between emerging perceptual accounts of knowing other minds and traditional theory of mind approaches to the problem of other minds. We argue that the current formulations of the debate are conceptually misleading and empirically unfounded. Rather, the real contribution of PA is to point out a certain ‘immediacy’ that characterizes episodes of mindreading. We claim that while the intuition of immediacy should be preserved for explaining the nature and function of some cognitive processes of mindreading, the notion of immediacy should apply for describing a particular epistemic attitude and not a particular type of epistemic access. We draw on Wittgenstein's discussions of one's relation to other minds to elaborate our claims and to move the epistemological discussions beyond stalling debates between ToM and PA.
Keywords Wittgenstein  immediate mindreading  perceptual accounts  simulation theory  theory of mind  theory‐theory
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12196
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Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Direct Perception in the Intersubjective Context.S. Gallagher - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):535-543.

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