Visual Prominence and Representationalism

Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418 (2013)
Abstract
A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
Keywords Attention  Representationalism  Determinacy of representation  Visual prominence  Intentionalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9853-3
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References found in this work BETA
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

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Representationalism and the Determinacy of Visual Content.Ben Bronner - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (2):227-239.

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