Assertion and assessment sensitivity

Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 60 (143):355-376 (2019)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Gareth Evans and Sven Rosenkranz have respectively formulated two objections to truth relativism that would show that this view does not cohere with our practice of asserting. I argue that the relativist should answer such objections by appealing to the notion of assessment sensitivity. Since the relativist accounts for this notion by means of a technical truth predicate relating propositions to contexts of assessment, the task left to her turns out to be to make sense of assessment sensitivity by making sense of this predicate. RESUMO Gareth Evans e Sven Rosenkranz formularam, respectivamente, duas objeções ao relativismo da verdade que mostrariam que esta visão não é coerente com nossa prática de afirmar. Defendo que o relativista deve responder a tais objeções apelando à noção de sensibilidade da avaliação. Tendo em mente que o relativista considera essa noção por meio de um predicado de verdade técnica, a tarefa deixada para ele calha de ser dar sentido à sensibilidade da avaliação mediante dar sentido a esse predicado.

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Matías Gariazzo León
Universidad de La República, Uruguai

Citations of this work

Truth and directness in pictorial assertion.Lukas Lewerentz & Emanuel Viebahn - 2023 - Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (6):1441–1465.

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References found in this work

Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.
On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.

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